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Abstract 
 
We examine the pattern and costs of worker displacement in one of the more reform- 
oriented transition countries, Estonia, as the transition process develops. Using  Labour 
Force Survey data covering the period 1989-1999, we show that after the initial shock, 
displacement rates in Estonia have fallen back to levels observed in several western 
economies, as the economy picks up. The incidence of displacement is also similar to that 
in the West – concentrated on the less skilled and those with short job tenure.  Roughly 
half of those displaced find re-employment within two months while the other half lingers 
on in the state of non-employment. There is less evidence however of a wage penalty to 
job loss, unlike in some Western countries, a fact one might attribute more to the nature 
of the transition process than to wage setting institutions in Estonia. The main cost of 
displacement is then the income loss due to non-employment, which is severe for a 
minority of workers who experience long-term non-employment. 
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The Incidence and Cost of Job Loss in a Transition Economy. Displaced Workers in 
Estonia, 1989-1999 
 
Hartmut Lehmann, Kaia Phillips and Jonathan Wadsworth 
 
“Toto, I’ve a feeling we are not in Kansas any more” – Dorothy in the ‘Wizard of Oz’ 
 
1. Introduction 
Most transition economies go through deep recessions at the onset of the shift from 
planned to market economy. Estonia was no exception. This paper is concerned with 
identifying the workers displaced by the transition process and the costs associated with 
that upheaval. There is a large empirical Western literature on job displacement, 
summarised in Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002), which has endeavoured to establish the 
extent, incidence and costs of displacement. As Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993a) 
point out, policy-makers need to be aware of the size of the losses borne by displaced 
workers when considering intervention, training or compensation.  These features seem 
particularly pertinent for transition economies where institutional structures are often 
evolving as rapidly as large scale restructuring and reallocation in the labour market. 
Even if quits comprise the major share of separations from jobs in transition economies, 
the scale of the reallocation process is often such that large numbers of displaced workers 
result from the shock of transition.  
The western literature on displacement focuses on seniority, firm-specific human 
capital premia and union wage premia as the main reasons why there could be substantial 
earnings losses for displaced workers. In mainland Europe, the cost of job loss appears to 
be lower than in the United States or in Britain, (see Kuhn (2002)) and this appears to be 
driven by institutional features in Europe, which cushion unemployment income, job 
finding and pay in return jobs. In many transition economies, institutional factors are less William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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likely to ameliorate the costs of job loss. Unions play a relatively minor role in the wage 
determination process, and welfare support systems are rather under-developed and 
ungenerous, (Boeri and Terrell (2002)).  In contrast, it might be that the nature of a 
transition economy, with more rapid restructuring and labour reallocation than in the 
West, (Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)), could create a sufficiently dynamic environment 
where job moves occur quickly and productivity levels in the new and restructured 
sectors offer relatively high wage prospects. In this case, the welfare costs of job loss 
could be relatively low. As yet, little empirical evidence on displaced workers exists for 
transition economies, which can help distinguish between these possible outcomes. 
In Estonia, employment protection legislation appears comparable to that in many 
western European countries, (see annex 2 and Kuhn (2002)). This would suggest, other 
things equal, that the incidence of job loss should also be broadly comparable. However 
the potential costs of job loss could be high since the criteria for unemployment benefit 
are rather strict, unemployment payments are flat-rate and very low, even by the 
standards set in other transition economies (see annex). While this makes it necessary for 
most individuals to try to return to work rapidly, the implied high search costs resulting 
from low benefits may compromise efficient matching and may increase the likelihood of 
wage penalties associated with displacement. 
The other potential costs of job loss stem from differences in wages between old 
and new jobs. Wage-setting institutions help determine both the wages displaced workers 
have at the time of dismissal as well as their re-entry wages.  In the early stages of 
Estonian transition, unions were virtually absent and wages were still tied to Soviet wage 
grids, which did have an in-built recognition of seniority, so that higher tenured workers William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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could expect to receive higher wages. If these workers lose their jobs, their skills gained 
under the old order may, however, not be in demand in a restructuring transition 
economy, as Lehmann and Wadsworth (2000) argue, and they then may suffer most from 
displacement. Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) document large job creation rates in 
Estonia during the early stages of transition. This might indicate that Estonia was indeed 
sufficiently dynamic for many workers to obtain wages comparable or higher to those in 
the job from which displacement occurred.
1     
Hence, our intuition does not give us clear guidance as to the likely wage change 
following displacement and eventual reemployment in a transition economy and 
empirical evidence is required.  If displaced workers can find new work relatively quickly 
and receive wages that exceed those in their former job then there may be less concern 
over job displacement than if long-term unemployment and a future of low paying jobs is 
the norm.   
This study tries to establish the facts about worker displacement in Estonia in the 
years after transition.  We analyse how the pattern of displacement has changed from the 
initial stages of transition to the present, more mature, stage of transition. We compare 
how the characteristics of displaced workers differ from other workers who experience 
joblessness and those workers who manage to avoid non-employment through transition 
and whether these characteristics have changed over time. We then estimate hazard rates 
from non-employment for displaced workers and for those who quit their jobs to see 
whether displaced workers experience longer or shorter non-employment spells and 
                                                           
1 If outside wage prospects are good, why do workers not quit their old job before displacement? In a 
transition economy workers might not do so because of uncertainty. While it might be generally true that 
workers who find employment in some industries in the private sector have higher wages and/or wage William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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whether there are systematic differences across the two groups. We also present 
difference-in-difference estimates of the earnings change associated with displacement in 
order to establish the extent of any pecuniary costs of job displacement. The next section 
outlines the data used in our study, while sections 3 and 4 discuss the incidence, duration 
and cost of job loss during transition respectively. Section 5 offers some conclusions on 
the overall cost of displacement. 
 
2. Data 
Our principal sources of information are the 1995, 1997 and 1999 Estonian Labour Force 
Surveys, (ELFS). Undertaken in the spring of each year, the ELFS sampled around 10000 
and 12000 working age individuals in 1995 and 1999, while in 1997 only about 5000 
were sampled. Each survey contains a retrospective labour market history section, which 
invites respondents to give details of changes in their labour market status and income 
between January 1989 and December 1994, in the case of the 1995 survey, between 
January 1995 and January 1997, in the case of the 1997 survey, and between January 
1998 and January 1999, in the case of the 1999 survey. Our definition of a displaced 
worker mirrors that used in the western literature.  Displaced workers are generally taken 
to be those separated involuntarily from their jobs by mass layoff or plant closure. 
Workers dismissed because of individual job performance are often excluded from this 
definition because of concerns whether such separations should be categorised as 
displacement. In the Estonian context, the survey questionnaire allows us to distinguish 
between job loss because of plant closure, personnel reductions, dismissal or 
                                                                                                                                                                             
growth than in the old state job, it is not clear in a transition environment that the worker will find re-
employment rapidly, so the expected return to mobility could be negative.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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privatisation. Since we cannot be sure that dismissal is individual or mass-based we retain 
these individuals in our definition of displacement.
2 We also identify those who left their 
jobs for other reasons – temporary workers, parental leave, retirements and those who 
quit their jobs in the hope of finding something better. In most of what follows we group 
these job leavers together.  
All survey data that try to capture displacement are plagued to some degree by a 
selection bias. If workers have rational expectations about the economic viability of their 
firm then those workers with good prospects in the labour market might quit the firm 
before it is closed down or before mass layoffs occur, leaving those colleagues with 
“worse” characteristics behind. In restructuring firms that do not close down but initiate 
mass layoffs, “better quality” workers might, however, remain with the firm as post-
restructuring productivity gains might imply high wage growth.
3 Whatever the selection 
mechanism, as long as this mechanism exists, displacement is not a purely exogenous 
event. It would be so if economic reality mimicked a social experiment, where from one 
day to the next a lottery would decide who is to be displaced and who is not. Seen in this 
way, displacement can never be purely exogenous.  
Are selection problems related to mass layoffs and plant closure particularly strong in 
a transition economy? Potential failure or poor performance of firms might be to easier to 
perceive in a transition economy and good workers might then be more likely to leave the 
firm long before closure or large-scale labour shedding than in the West. On the other 
hand, good workers may have more reason to hold on to their old job in restructuring 
                                                           
2  The numbers of workers who say they are dismissed is very small in practice, no more than 3% of the 
total displaced stock. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of survey data that try to capture 
displacement see Kuhn (2002).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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firms because of higher future rewards after restructuring. Workers may also hold on to 
their jobs because of greater uncertainty in a rapidly changing transition labour market. 
This uncertainty is particularly strong in the early stages of transition, when most 
displacement occurs in Estonia, as we show below. Which of these scenarios prevails in a 
transition economy is not clear a priori. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
estimates of jobless duration and the cost of job loss which follow. When comparing 
those who quit with those who are displaced, a caveat of potential selection bias should 
be kept in mind.
4 
We have information on the year and month of any job change and the duration of 
any intervening non-employment spell. Respondents are also asked to give gross monthly 
wages received at certain periods covered by the survey. If a worker leaves or loses a job 
they are asked to give their final salary (gross monthly Eesti Kroons, (EEK)). If a worker 
starts a new job they are asked to give their starting salary. Those who stay in their job 
are asked to give their wages in October of each year between 1989 and 1995 and in each 
January in the years after that. We exclude all those who work abroad and outliers below 
100EEK and above 10000 EEK. Because of concerns over the reliability of retrospective 
data in periods of hyper-inflation and when the Rouble was the national currency, we 
exclude the years before 1992 from our wage analysis
5. 
3. The Incidence of Displacement in Estonia, 1989-98 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 For example Pfann (2001) finds that workers with higher expected productivity growth and large 
uncertainty of expected growth in productivity are “better quality” workers retained by the firm. Such 
workers might also want to stay in the restructuring firm.  
4 Some people might feel that the distinction between displaced workers and voluntary quitters is  blurred 
in survey data. If there is, however, a data set that allows do distinguish between the two groups of workers, 
it is the Estonian one, arguably one of the most comprehensive Labour Force data sets in the world.  
5  The Eesti Kroon replaced the Rouble at a rate of 15EEK=1Rb in June 1992. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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We begin with an outline of the basic facts about displacement in Estonia. Figure 1 and 
the last row of Table 1 outline the pattern of annual job displacement rates in Estonia in 
the years immediately before transition and the years after. It is apparent that 
displacement built up gradually during the initial transition period, from just 1 percent a 
year in 1989 to a peak of 13% in 1992, before falling back to around 6% in 1998. These 
later figures are broadly comparable with those from the Western literature (Kuhn 2002), 
whilst the incidence in the early nineties is clearly excessive by western standards. 
Annual worker separation rates in East Germany, where comparable survey data are 
available, show a similar pattern and rates over the transition, peaking at around 12% at 
the beginning of transition. Displacement rates in Estonia, therefore, seem to be as large 
as in the one transition economy thought to have the most severe employment 
contraction, following social and monetary union in 1990.
6     
As Figure 1 shows, redundancies rather than plant closures account for the 
majority of displacement.  Plant closures reached a peak, at around a fifth of all 
displacements, in 1993.  The incidence of quits is much larger than that of displacements, 
except in 1992 and 1993 when the majority of displacements occurred.  Quits also grew 
through the early stage of transition and fell back at the end of the nineties. This seems to 
be because both retirements and voluntary quits have fallen back in recent years. 
The magnitudes and direction of the flows of displaced workers in Estonia lend 
support to a model of labour reallocation from the state to the private sector, the latter of 
which is comprised of privatised and new private firms. In 1992, 73% of all workers were 
                                                           
6 In future work we will analyse displacement from a comparative perspective looking at Estonia and East 
Germany, both fast reformers but with very different labour market institutions. In this paper the German 
data are used only to highlight the large layoff rates in Estonia. East German displacement rates are 
available on request. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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employed in the state sector.  In 1998, 34% of all workers were employed in this sector. 
While in 1992 77% of all displaced workers came from the state sector, this percentage 
fell to 17% in 1998. Roughly half of the workers displaced from a state sector job in 1992 
ended up holding a job in the private sector, while in 1998 this fraction rose to 75%.   
  Table 1 shows that men were more likely to experience displacement, but that this 
gender difference may have disappeared by the late nineties. Displacement rates are 
relatively uniform across age groups, but displacement does tend to fall 
disproportionately on the less skilled, (both manual and non-manual).  The incidence of 
displacement by job tenure falls across all tenure groups from the early to the later stage 
of transition, but much more so for workers new to their jobs.  While this group was most 
likely to lose their job during the initial transition phase, they are now least likely. Job 
loss is much lower in public administration throughout, while displacement in the nascent 
retail trade, hotel and finance sectors is high. Displacement in the state sector is higher in 
the early stages of transition, suggestive of substantial restructuring, but thereafter 
displacement rates are higher in the private sector, now comprising two thirds of the 
employment stock.  
  Are the displaced in Estonia different from other workers? In the face of a truly 
exogenous shock affecting all sectors equally there may be less reason to suspect that 
displaced workers would be very different from other workers. However, Table 1 
suggests that displacement is non-random. This is reflected in the differences in worker 
characteristics shown in Table 2. Men account for a larger share of the displaced than of 
either quits or stayers, though this differential falls over time.  Job losers are typically 
middle aged compared with job quitters, though their educational and occupational William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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backgrounds seem to be very similar. In the early nineties, agricultural and in the late 
nineties manufacturing sector workers are more likely to be displaced.  
Low tenure workers are more likely to quit.  However, during the initial transition 
period there was a high incidence of quits across the tenure distribution, in part brought 
on by a large volume of early retirements among those with the highest tenure category. 
Note that median tenure for job displacement was around 5 years in 1992 and has fallen 
below this in the late nineties. A similar reduction in median tenure amongst job quits can 
also be seen in Table 2, to a little over two years in 1998. Short job tenure is unlikely to 
be associated with much firm-specific capital. However in 1992, almost one third of those 
who lost their jobs had more than 5 years tenure, falling back to around 17% in 1998. For 
these workers firm-specific capital is likely to be more substantial.   
Most of these patterns are confirmed, holding other characteristics constant, in the 
multinomial logit regressions given in Table 3 for the pooled samples of 1992/93, the 
early stage of transition in Estonia, and of 1995/98, when transition was in a more mature 
stage. Throughout the nineties, university graduates have a lower incidence of 
displacement and quits of between 4 to 5 percentage points than less educated workers. In 
the early stage of transition the probability of being displaced was roughly 6 percentage 
points higher in state-owned firms and 10 percentage points lower in foreign owned firms 
than in privatised or new private firms, a pattern that disappears in the later stages of 
transition.
7 It is also noteworthy that in the later nineties, Estonians had a lower 
probability of being displaced than non-Estonians (mainly Russians). Ethnicity did not 
play a role in the early years of transition, when firm attributes were generally more 
important than demographic characteristics as the magnitude and significance of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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marginal effects in the first column of table 3 demonstrate.  When displacement was high 
by western standards, age, industry affiliation, ownership type of a worker’s firm and 
firm size were the main factors behind closures and permanent layoffs.  
 
4. The Cost of Job Displacement in Estonia 
 
We next attempt to outline the possible costs of job loss in Estonia and whether these 
have changed over time. Job loss involves both a risk of non-employment and a 
possibility of lower wages for those workers who find new employment.  
 
Displacement and non-employment spells 
 
We begin, following Farber (1993), with a simple tabulation of the percentage of workers 
displaced in one year who were employed again in the spring of the following year. Table 
4 shows that there is little evidence of any cyclical component in re-employment 
probabilities, indeed the chances of finding a job once displaced appear to fall steadily 
through the nineties. In 1990, more than 75% of those displaced could expect to be back 
in work the following Spring. By 1999, this re-employment rate had fallen to just 47%. 
The re-employment rate for job quits rises and then falls back over time and is far lower 
than the rate of displaced workers in the early phase of transition and roughly equal 
towards the end of the nineties.   
These results are confirmed by multivariate regressions, not shown here.
8 We look 
at marginal effects from probit estimates of the re-employment probability, using a set of 
characteristics common to all the population of working age one year earlier and a set of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 After 1995 there is no information on whether a firm is privatised or a new private start-up. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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dummy variable interactions for displaced workers. The relative disadvantage of the 
average displaced worker, other things equal, finding a new job rises from 36 percentage 
points in 1993/94 to 55 percentage points in 1998/99. There are few variations around 
this average as virtually none of the interactions are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
We next report the cumulative return rates to employment, conditional on non-
employment duration, of displaced workers and compare these to return rates of quits for 
the years 1992,1993,1995 and 1998 in Table 5. These rates are based on the complement 
of Kaplan-Meier survivor functions in non-employment. Roughly 50% of the displaced 
return to full-time work during the first three months of non-employment, with around a 
third returning within one month of displacement. It is also interesting to note that at least 
half the people who return to work within six months do so during the first month.  These 
rates are similar to figures in the volume by Kuhn, (2002), which suggest that two-thirds 
of US displaced workers are re-employed within six months. In Britain roughly half 
return within two months.  
Outflows in Estonia taper off rapidly after the first three months, something we 
investigate more closely below. For the years before 1995, displaced workers have 
similar return rates over the first six months of any spell to those who quit. This suggests 
that the adverse selection problems one might encounter when analysing a pool of 
displaced workers in a transition economy may not be that serious for our sample of 
Estonian workers.   
We next analyse hazard rates from non-employment. The Kaplan-Meier estimates 
of these rates over the sample period are given in Table 6 and Figure 2. In the early years 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 These regressions are available from the authors on request. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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of the sample there are high hazard rates in the first two months, after that the hazard 
rates fall dramatically and stay uniformly low. In the later years, hazard rates fall 
precipitously after the first month.  The hazard rates of displaced workers are generally 
not statistically different from those of quits at most spell lengths. 
Summarising, roughly half the displaced workers each year find a new job 
rapidly, while the other half has great difficulties in flowing back into employment. Since 
unemployment benefits and related welfare payments are extremely low in Estonia, with 
an average replacement rate of around 10% (see Tables A5 and A6 in the annex)
9, these 
findings have at least two implications. First, any incentive problems generated by the 
benefit system are less likely to be able to explain this flat hazard rate after two months. 
Rather, it seems that there are factors at work which absorb rapidly the half of the 
displaced worker flow with the “right” characteristics.  Secondly, those unable to flow 
into employment fast, incur large income losses.  Income losses would be greatly 
exaggerated however if people took up work in the informal sector. In Estonia, a small 
and socially tightly knit country, the informal sector is probably not as much developed 
as in many other transition countries and unemployed workers are likely to rely mainly 
on income transfers from family and friends (Eamets, 2001).    
Which are the driving factors behind the hazard rates? For the early and later 
stages of transition (1992-93 and 1995-98 respectively) we pool the data and estimate 
parametric hazard functions for displaced workers and quits (Table 7), allowing for 
unobserved heterogeneity in the distributions of the hazard rates across the sample. We 
use a mixture distribution, integrating out the heterogeneity with an Inverse-Gaussian 
                                                           
9 An IMF report on Baltic and Bulgarian labour markets terms these benefit ratios “parsimonious” (see 
IMF, 2001).   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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parametric function. Figures A.1-A.4 in the appendix show that a Gompertz model that 
takes account of unobserved heterogeneity fits the data better than other parametric 
models, since the Cox-Snell residual plots are distributed like an exponential distribution 
with mean 1 when the parametric model fits well (Smith, 2002). As before, we exclude 
those who leave a job for retirement. Tables A.1 and A.2 show that a small fraction of 
this group eventually flow back into employment, but the results are not affected 
substantially by this exclusion.
10  
Table 7 shows that only in the more mature stage of transition do displaced 
workers find it harder to regain employment than quits. In contrast to the results in Table 
3 concerning the incidence of job loss, we find that individual characteristics and not firm 
and job attributes of previous employment play the predominant role in the determination 
of the return to work hazard. There appears to be a positive age effect, although at a 
diminishing rate for both displaced workers and quits.
11 Female displaced workers and 
those with less education have substantially lower hazard rates throughout the decade
12, 
while in both periods Estonians have rates that are substantially higher among displaced 
workers as well as among those who quit. While ethnicity is not a determinant factor 
when it comes to permanent layoffs, it is of great importance in flows back to 
employment. Regional location, working time, tenure and sector, on the other hand, play 
no role in the determination of the hazard for the displaced. The duration dependence 
parameters are all negative and significant, which in the context of the Gompertz 
                                                           
10 The results including retirees are available on request. 
11 The significance of the unobserved heterogeneity component in the estimates does not allow the 
conversion of the maximum likelihood coefficients into proportional changes in the hazard ratio. 
12 Table A3 shows regressions by gender. Pooling the data seems admissible, since a formal test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of equal slope coefficients across gender.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
  14
distribution suggests that there is a non-zero probability of remaining out of work at any 
infinitely large spell length.   
    
Are there earnings losses for displaced workers?    
We now examine the earnings changes of those displaced workers who leave from and 
return to a full-time job. Table 8 contains estimates of changes of log wages for job 
movers, i.e. displaced workers and quitters who found again employment, pooled over 
the early period of transition (1992/1993) and over the later period (1995/98).  Wages are 
observed immediately before and after the job change in the first period, but, because of a 
change in the survey questionnaire, up to one year apart in the second period, in the early 
period of transition (1992/1993). Few characteristics have any predictive power for the 
change in the log of wages.     
There is little evidence that job tenure influences wage changes holding other 
factor constant. Those displaced from a job who avoid a period out of work between jobs 
appear to benefit in the early transition period, but this effect does not persist into the 
latter half of the period. Thereafter, the length of non-employment has no effect. Workers 
displaced from transport experience a wage change that is roughly 20% higher than the 
change experienced by workers displaced from agriculture. If industry-specific human 
capital is important for maintaining previous wage levels in new jobs (Neal, 1995), then 
changing industry should result in a wage penalty. This idea is not supported by the data.  
Finally, whether displaced workers find employment in a private or state-owned firm 
does not seem to affect the wage change that they experience. It seems pretty clear from 
the presented means, though, that quits have in their new jobs on average higher wages William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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than both stayers and displaced workers. For both displaced workers and quitters there is, 
however, a large premium for finding employment in a foreign firm.  
The results of Table 8 point to the factors that drive wage changes for job movers, 
they do not, of course, tell us about the earnings loss due to displacement. In order to 
evaluate this earnings loss we need to compare the wage in the new job with its 
counterfactual, i.e. with the wage that would have prevailed if the worker had not been 
displaced and had remained in the original job until the date when the wage is next 
observed. We construct difference-in-differences estimators by estimating models with 
the dependent variable as the change in log wages of stayers, displaced workers and/or 
quitters and dummy variables for different subsets of displaced and a dummy variable for 
quitters.  If the conditional expectation of the outcome variable (the wage) before the 
treatment (displacement) were the same for treated (displaced) and non-treated (stayers), 
the effect of displacement on earnings would be identified with this difference-in-
differences estimator.  
One of the problems of analysing earnings losses for the displaced is, however, 
that these workers might experience a deterioration of their pay before they are displaced, 
something observed by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan  (1993b) in the United States.  
Table A.4 gives real wage profiles over time (1992-95) for stayers, displaced workers and 
those who quit. For stayers we have information on real wages in each October for the 
years 1992-94 and in the Spring of 1995, while displaced workers and quits also provide 
information on their last wage in the old job and their starting wage in the new job. The 
end and start wages in the last four columns seem to indicate that there is more of an 
“inflation dip” than an “Ashenfelter dip”, as the mean real wage for both displaced William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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workers and quits falls between the October 1992 or October 1993 wage and the end 
wage.  The period between 1992 and 1994 saw substantial double-digit inflation, 
subsiding to 5% in the last quarter of 1994, resulting in a declining real wage during this 
period. The earnings of those displaced in 1992 do not seem to recover by Spring 1995, 
whereas the earnings of those displaced in 1993 and 1994 seem to do so.   
The observation that displaced workers are no worse affected by a declining real 
wage than quits, leads us to conjecture that stayers probably also experience this 
“inflation dip”, because of infrequent changes to nominal wages. While we cannot be 
sure that wage movements before displacement do not affect our difference-in-
differences estimates, the evidence above suggests any such movements may be limited.  
In addition, if we take a subset of the displaced, displaced within a shorter period of time, 
and undertake difference-in-difference estimates across one and two year intervals then 
we do not find any significant differences on the displaced coefficients
13. This also 
suggests that any wage dip effect may be limited. 
The one, two or three year wage changes for displaced workers and voluntary 
movers is given by the difference in the October wage in the original job and the October 
wage in the subsequent job one year or two years later. These changes are compared to 
the wage changes over the same period of those who stayed in the same job.
14  We report 
in Table 9 estimates for all displaced and for sub-samples of displaced with varying spell 
lengths in non-employment. These suggest that there is a positive wage gain in all stages 
of transition for voluntary movers, although this gain declines over time. There is, 
                                                           
13  For example we take all those displaced in the first 9 months of 1993 and observe the wage change 
compared with stayers between October 1992 and 1993 and between October 1992 and 1994. Results are 
available on request. 
14 For the period 1996-98 we have wages not in October but in January of each year. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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however, little evidence of any differential wage changes between the total sample of 
those who were displaced from a job and those who stayed.  Only in 1996 is there a 
significant negative wage loss of 7.2 log points for displaced workers.  In 1993 there is a 
wage gain for the average displaced worker who moves without a spell of non-
employment that becomes negative for those of the displaced who have non-employment 
spells of more than 6 months. For the years 1992-93 and 1995-97 we find, however, wage 
penalties of roughly 2 log points per month of displacement. The estimates in Table 9 are 
also done with controls, for variables, industry, firm size and ownership that change over 
the period. Since these change variables are necessarily zero for stayers, they serve to 
disaggregate the displaced group more and the displacement effect, as a result, is less 
precisely measured. The upshot of these results is at any rate that the main cost of job loss 
in Estonia seems to be the income loss brought on by being out of work. For a majority of 
displaced Estonian workers this income loss is modest, however, given that the median 
duration of non-employment of displaced workers is less than three months. For a 
minority of those displaced workers who remain in non-employment for at least a year, 
i.e. for between 16 and 38 percent of the displaced workers in the nineties, the income 
loss is likely to be large and it is this group of displaced workers who may need to be 
helped with targeted policy intervention.   
Conclusions 
Displacement rates in Estonia reached a peak of 13% in 1992, but were very small at the 
beginning of transition and, during the more mature phase of transition, roughly equal to 
rates in several western countries.  Who are the workers who experience job loss? Men 
were more likely to experience displacement in the early years, but that distinction may William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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have been removed by the late nineties. Only workers over the age of 55 are relatively 
less likely to experience displacement, but displacement does tend to fall on the less 
skilled manual and non-manual. Job loss is generally higher in the production sector than 
in services, though displacement in the emerging retail trade and finance sectors is high. 
There is little evidence that these relative patterns have changed over time.  
  The cost of job displacement is mainly associated with the risk of non-
employment and not with potentially lower wages in the newly acquired job.  Estimates 
of the probability of re-employment for displaced and non-displaced workers, show that 
the relative disadvantage of the average displaced worker, other things equal, finding a 
new job rises over the period from 36 percentage points in 1993 to 55 points in 1999. 
When we analyse the hazard from non-employment for displaced workers and quitters we 
find that above all demographic characteristics have predictive power. Younger, female 
and less educated workers have substantially lower hazard rates throughout the nineties. 
It is particularly striking that, ceteris paribus, Estonians have substantially higher hazard 
rates than those of the non-Estonian (mainly Russian) minority. So, while ethnicity is not 
an important factor as far as layoffs are concerned, it is clearly important with regards to 
finding re-employment. Our hazard rate analysis also shows that it is crucial for displaced 
workers to leave non-employment soon after displacement as hazard rates are uniformly 
low for non-employment spell lengths greater than three months. 
  There is little evidence of any differential wage changes between the total sample 
of those who were displaced from a job and those who stayed.  Only in one year is there a 
significant difference in the wage change between the total sample of the displaced and 
those who remained in their job. Those among the displaced who remain for long periods William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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in non-employment seem to incur, however, some wage penalties in several years. The 
main cost of job loss in Estonia seems at any rate to be the income loss brought on by 
being out of work. Given extremely low unemployment benefit payments and stringent 
eligibility criteria, this income loss is likely to be large for that minority of displaced 
workers who remain in long-term non-employment. Policies alleviating the plight of 
these workers should be a priority for Estonian policy makers.     
  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Figure 1. Worker Separation Rates by Year 
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       Figure 2. Hazard Rates for Displaced Workers and Voluntary Quits in Estonia 1992-1998 
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Table 1. Job Displacement Rates (%), 1989-98  
1989 1992 1994 1996 1998
Demographic   
Men 1.7 14.4 8.6 5.8  6.5
Women 1.0 12.2 7.8 5.9  6.6
Estonian 1.4 13.5 7.5 5.7  5.4
Non-Estonian 1.2 13.0 9.6 7.0  7.5
Age  
16-24 2.3 12.1 9.8 8.1  6.7
25-39 1.5 13.2 8.8 6.5  5.6
40-54 1.1 13.9 7.6 5.2  5.9
55-64 0.7 13.0 7.0 6.5  6.7
Education   
Primary and basic  1.6 14.3 8.5 8.9  7.8
Secondary 1.4 15.4 10.3 6.7  7.3
Vocational 1.2 13.2 8.1 6.2  5.5
University 1.2 9.7 5.4 3.6  4.1
Job tenure   
< 1 year  2.3 16.3 10.7 4.3  2.9
1 year  1.8 14.5 8.2 7.2  7.7
2-5 years  1.6 13.3 8.6 6.1  6.0
6-10 years  1.0 14.9 9.6 6.8  4.7
11 and more years  1.0 11.9 6.8 5.4  5.9
Occupation 
Professionals 1.3 11.5 7.1 4.2  4.1
Other non-manual  1.2 13.2 9.9 7.5  8.0
Skilled manual workers  1.3 14.1 7.2 7.1  5.4
Unskilled manual workers  1.6 15.2 9.8 7.5  8.0
Industry   
Agriculture 1.1 18.7 8.3 3.8  4.4
Manufacturing and electricity  1.1 12.4 8.5 7.3  7.8
Construction 2.1 16.8 6.9 9.9  7.5
Trade and hotels  1.5 16.9 13.8 9.0  8.4
Transport 0.8 9.8 6.8 5.7  6.5
Finance 4.1 11.8 8.3 5.7  7.6
Public 1.0 7.9 5.1 3.5  2.2
Sector   
State            1.4        14.4          7.9  5.3  3.5
Private 0.3 9.8 8.5 6.1  8.1
Total  1.3 13.2 8.1 5.8 6.4
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    Table 2. Characteristics of Job Losers,  Leavers and Stayers, 1989-98 
  1989 1992 1994 1998 
  Lost Quit Stay Lost Quit Stay Lost Quit Stay Lost Quit Stay 
Men  61.4 42.6 49.4 55.6 51.9 50.7 54.3 57 50.5 49.6 55.1 50.8
Estonian  38.5 65.8 64.6 44.4 67.5 64.4 45.7 71.8 65.9 50.4 78.6 74.3
Age 15-24  18.1 26.7 8.4 9.2 20.6 8.4 12.7 20.6 8.3 10.3 19 7.7
Age 25-39  44.6 38.5 40.5 37.8 35 38.7 40.2 41.7 36.5 34.8 41.3 37.1
Age 40-54  30.1 17.1 37.5 39.1 20.6 40.5 36.1 25.9 41.9 38.8 27.3 40.8
Age 55+  7.2 17.6 13.6 13.8 23.7 12.4 10.9 11.8 13.3 16.0 12.4 14.4
Education   
Basic  24.1 20 19.8 18.1 20.3 16.0 14.3 13.8 13.7 17.3 15.4 12.7
Secondary  24.1 23.3 22.6 28.5 26.3 23.5 32.7 31.1 24.3 27.8 23 22.3
Technical  36.1 40.1 40.7 40.9 39 41.9 40.7 39.1 42.0 42.9 49.4 46.5
Graduate  15.7 16.6 16.9 12.5 14.2 18.6 12.3 16 20.0 12.0 12.1 18.5
Occupation             
Professional  33.7 33 36.1 30.7 30.8 37.4 32.0 29.6 39.0 24.1 24.3 37.8
Other Non-Manual  12.0 16.8 13.0 13.6 13.6 13.7 19.7 19 15.2 21.0 19.4 14.9
Skilled Manual  25.3 28 26.1 28.3 30.2 25.9 21.7 28.7 24.2 20.8 27.1 22.8
Unskilled Manual  28.9 22.2 24.8 27.5 25.5 23.1 26.5 22.6 21.6 34.1 29.3 24.5
Industry   
Agriculture  16.9 17.3 20.6 26.1 15.9 17.7 13.4 12.9 13.4 9.0 10.8 12.6
Manufacturing  25.3 27.7 29.9 26.9 29.9 29.1 27.0 24.3 26.2 34.8 26.3 26.2
Construction  12.0 7.7 7.6 10.6 11.1 7.5 6.1 9 7.1 8.8 10 6.5
Trade  10.8 9.9 9.9 14.6 14.5 10.3 26.1 19.1 13.6 21.8 20.2 14.4
Transport  4.8 7.7 7.9 5.9 5.3 9.0 7.0 7.8 8.9 8.8 6.8 8.1
Finance  14.5 4.5 4.6 3.8 4.2 4.4 5.4 6.7 5.1 8.0 7.6 6.0
Public  15.7 25.2 19.6 12.0 19.2 22.0 14.8 20.2 25.7 8.8 18.4 26.3
Job Tenure              
<1 year  7.2 5 4.0 2.5 3.8 1.7 3.9 6.1 2.2 2.3 7.8 4.3
1-2 years  16.9 22.1 11.4 17.7 23.3 14.7 25.7 39.2 22.7 27.6 35.4 18.8
2-5 years  31.3 35.6 24.0 27.8 32.6 27.0 33.9 31.6 32.2 38.6 37.6 38.9
5-10 years  14.5 16.6 20.0 18.6 12.5 17.1 13.6 7.7 12.3 12.0 10.1 16.5
10 years+  30.1 20.7 40.5 33.3 27.8 39.6 22.9 15.4 30.6 19.5 9.1 21.5William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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 Table 3. Who is Displaced? Multinomial Logit Estimates (Marginal Effects) – 1992/93 & 1995/98 
 1992/93  1995/98 
 Displaced  Quit  Displaced  Quit 
Female -.020 
(.012) 
 .007 
(.013) 
 .003 
(.005) 
 .007 
(.008) 
Estonian -.016 
(.013) 
 .059** 
(.014) 
-.017** 
(.005) 
 .011 
(.008) 
Age    .011** 
(.003) 
-.057** 
(.003) 
-.006 
(.001) 
-.020** 
(.002) 
Age
2 -.0001** 
(.00004) 
 .0007** 
(.00004) 
.00001 
(.00001) 
 .0002** 
(.00004) 
 - University  -.052** 
(.022) 
-.056** 
(.023) 
-.036** 
(.010) 
-.053** 
(.014) 
- Vocational   -.018 
(.019) 
-.026 
(.019) 
-.018** 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.010) 
- Secondary    .017 
(.019) 
-.032 
(.020) 
-.011 
(.008) 
-.016 
(.011) 
Job Tenure 
<1 year 
 
-.188** 
(.026) 
  
 .001 
(.024) 
 
-.041** 
(.009) 
 
 .085** 
(.014) 
1-2 years 
 
 .060** 
(.019) 
 .143** 
(.021) 
 .002 
(.008) 
 .125** 
(.013) 
2-5 years   .045** 
(.019) 
 .113** 
(.020) 
 .001 
(.008) 
 .098** 
(.013) 
5-10 years   .036** 
(.015) 
 .061** 
(.019) 
-.020** 
(.008) 
 .026 
(.014) 
Ownership 
State owned 
 
 .064** 
(.021) 
 
 .004 
(.021) 
 
 .009 
(.007) 
 
-.023** 
(.011) 
Privatised -.019 
(.026) 
-.214** 
(.028) 
N/a N/a 
Foreign owned  -.104** 
(.028) 
 .025 
(.026) 
-.014 
(.010) 
-.037** 
(.014) 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
 
-.118** 
(.017) 
 
 .045** 
(.020) 
 
 .029** 
(.009) 
 
-.008 
(.013) 
Construction -.075** 
(.022) 
 .121** 
(.026) 
 .034** 
(.011) 
 .029 
(.016) 
Retail -.027 
(.021) 
 .088** 
(.024) 
 .043** 
(.010) 
 .012 
(.014) 
Transport -.200** 
(.025) 
-.007 
(.029) 
 .008 
(.012) 
 .007 
(.017) 
Financial sector  -.089** 
(.030) 
 .036 
(.034) 
 .020 
(.013) 
-.005 
(.018) 
Public Services  -.251** 
(.021) 
-.020 
(.023) 
-.050** 
(.012) 
-.011 
(.016) 
Firm Size 
20-99 
 
 .076** 
(.031) 
 
 .015 
(.029) 
 
 .009 
(.006) 
 
 .008 
(.009) 
100-499   .018 
(.030) 
 .021 
(.029) 
 .004 
(.007) 
 .028** 
(.010) 
500+   .092** 
(.029) 
 .014 
(.028) 
 .005 
(.009) 
-.009 
(.015) 
        
N 
Psuedo R
2 
Sample Mean 
6536 
.112 
.246 
 
 
.306 
10495 
.055 
.079 
 
 
.168 
Notes: Coefficients are marginal effects. Standard errors in brackets with  ** significant at 5% level.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Table 4. Probability of Being in Employment 
by Displacement Status One Year Earlier 
In work in year  Employed  Non-employed 
1990   
Displaced 75.9  24.1 
Quit 50.5  49.5 
Stay 98.4    1.6 
1993   
Displaced 62.0  38.0 
Quit 48.8  51.2 
Stay 86.5  13.5 
1995   
Displaced 60.2  39.8 
Quit 62.8  37.2 
Stay 89.9  10.1 
1997   
Displaced 57.5  42.5 
Quit 55.7  44.3 
Stay 90.6    9.4 
1998   
Displaced 46.9  53.1 
Quit 49.8  50.1 
Stay 89.5  10.5 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Cumulative Return Rates for Job Movers in Estonia 
 1992 1993 1995 1998 
  Displaced Quit  Displaced  Quit  Displaced Quit  Displaced Quit 
% returning   
<1 month 
32.0 30.0  32.1  33.8  44.2 55.8  34.1 45.0 
% returning 
<3 months 
52.2 55.3  53.7  58.2  48.5 61.9  42.5 50.4 
% returning 
<6 months 
61.1 58.2  63.0  63.9  58.2 66.3  52.8 57.4 
                
N 889  797  810  937  165  312  454  908 
Note: Fractions based on one minus the Kaplan-Meier survivor function. Retirements are excluded 
from quits. 
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Table 6. Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates for Job Movers 
1992 1993 1995 1998  Duration 
(months)  Hazard s.e  Hazard s.e  Hazard s.e  Hazard s.e 
Displaced             
0-1  0.32 0.02  0.33 0.02  0.44 0.06  0.34 0.03
1-2  0.26 0.02  0.29 0.03  0.01 0.01  0.02 0.01
2-3  0.06 0.01  0.05 0.01  0.07 0.02  0.11 0.02
3-4  0.07 0.01  0.08 0.02  0.11 0.04  0.06 0.02
4-5  0.07 0.01  0.07 0.01  0.05 0.03  0.07 0.02
5-6  0.05 0.01  0.07 0.01  0.04 0.02  0.06 0.02
             
11-12  0.04 0.01  0.06 0.02  0.04 0.03  0.03 0.02
%  censored 17.5   20.4   18.2   42.1  
Quit             
0-1  0.30 0.02  0.33 0.02  0.56 0.05  0.45 0.03
1-2  0.34 0.02  0.34 0.02  0.02 0.01  0.01 0.01
2-3  0.04 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.12 0.03  0.09 0.01
3-4  0.03 0.01  0.07 0.01  0.05 0.02  0.05 0.01
4-5  0.04 0.01  0.07 0.01  0.07 0.02  0.05 0.01
5-6  0.04 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.03 0.01  0.05 0.01
            
11-12  0.02 0.01  0.05 0.01  0.04 0.02  0.07 0.02
% censored  20.7    16.3  18.9  37.7 
Note: The censoring cut-off points vary over the sample periodWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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 Table 7. Gompertz Proportional Hazard Estimates of Jobless Spell Excluding 
Movements into Retirement, (Pooled Samples). 
Variable 1992/93  1995/98 
 Total  Displaced Quit  Total  Displaced  Quit 
Displaced 0.044      -0.125     
 (0.047)      (0.061)*     
Individual        
Age  0.125 0.071 0.161 0.078 0.017 0.104 
 (0.013)**  (0.019)**  (0.018)** (0.017)** (0.033)  (0.020)**
Age2  -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)  (0.000)**
Female  -0.534 -0.346 -0.708 -0.381 -0.240 -0.449 
 (0.048)**  (0.066)**  (0.068)** (0.061)** (0.115)* (0.070)**
Primary  -0.609 -0.598 -0.608 -0.733 -0.851 -0.639 
 (0.087)**  (0.120)**  (0.126)** (0.115)** (0.212)** (0.133)**
Technical  -0.285 -0.315 -0.264 -0.551 -0.578 -0.523 
 (0.073)**  (0.106)**  (0.099)** (0.096)** (0.184)** (0.109)**
Secondary  -0.241 -0.231 -0.280 -0.456 -0.649 -0.343 
 (0.068)**  (0.099)*  (0.093)** (0.089)** (0.172)** (0.100)**
Estonian  0.305 0.308 0.311 0.338 0.314 0.318 
 (0.051)**  (0.073)**  (0.071)** (0.066)** (0.121)** (0.076)**
Capital  0.191 0.131 0.231 0.240 0.035 0.305 
 (0.051)**  (0.076)  (0.068)** (0.064)** (0.127)  (0.072)**
Job        
Part-time 0.127  -0.004  0.217  -0.231  -0.416  -0.138 
  (0.123) (0.207) (0.152) (0.119) (0.272) (0.127) 
Tenure  0.017 0.013 0.035 0.037 0.043 0.036 
 (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.016)*  (0.013)** (0.024)  (0.016)* 
Tenure2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)* (0.000)* (0.001)  (0.001) 
Firm  Size        
20-99 0.024  -0.136  0.142  -0.075  -0.121  -0.042 
  (0.107) (0.182) (0.131) (0.067) (0.129) (0.075) 
100-499 -0.037  -0.139  0.028  -0.027  -0.132  0.015 
  (0.104) (0.176) (0.127) (0.097) (0.187) (0.110) 
500+ 0.033  0.087  -0.016  0.003  -0.186  0.092 
  (0.101) (0.169) (0.127) (0.139) (0.258) (0.159) 
Industry        
Manufacturing  -0.085 -0.087 -0.069 -0.055 -0.128 -0.023 
  (0.071) (0.095) (0.107) (0.104) (0.204) (0.115) 
Construction  0.017  0.102  -0.044 -0.098 -0.008 -0.131 
  (0.087) (0.121) (0.125) (0.127) (0.256) (0.141) 
Retail  -0.023 0.134  -0.144 -0.014 -0.102 0.050 
  (0.082) (0.112) (0.121) (0.109) (0.218) (0.120) 
Transport  0.167 -0.008  0.302 0.077 -0.181  0.177 
 (0.102)  (0.145)  (0.144)*  (0.129)  (0.262)  (0.140) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Finance  0.010 0.041 0.007 0.109 0.236 0.099 
  (0.117) (0.163) (0.167) (0.140) (0.270) (0.157) 
Public service  -0.098  0.039  -0.183  0.021  -0.203  0.136 
  (0.085) (0.125) (0.120) (0.128) (0.269) (0.141) 
State  owned  -0.128 -0.239 -0.041 -0.115 0.095  -0.239 
  (0.072) (0.114)*  (0.093) (0.086) (0.155) (0.101)* 
Foreign 
owned 
-0.191 -0.057 -0.274 -0.079 0.265  -0.171 
 (0.103)  (0.173)  (0.128)*  (0.112)  (0.208)  (0.130) 
Privatised 0.094  0.059 -0.019       
 (0.097)  (0.137)  (0.145)       
1993 dummy  0.107  -0.003  0.209       
 (0.045)*  (0.063)  (0.064)**      
1996 dummy        -0.099  0.271  -0.235 
       (0.079)  (0.155)  (0.088)**
1998 dummy        -0.361  -0.240  -0.421 
       (0.075)** (0.146)  (0.083)**
        
        
Duration 
dependence. 
-.079 
(.006)** 
-.084 
(.009)** 
-.074 
(.007)** 
-.161 
(.013)** 
-.079 
(.020)** 
-.218 
(.018)** 
Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
0.322 
(.072)** 
0.251 
(.101)** 
0.310 
(.095)** 
0.255 
(.105)** 
0.668 
(.261)** 
0.017 
(.091)** 
        
Log L
  -5639 -2695 -2910 -3685 -1199 -2450 
Observations  3415 1624 1791 2449 794  1655 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. ** significant at 5%           William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Table 8 . Wage Changes for Job Movers (log gross monthly wage) 
 1992/93  1995/98 
 Displaced  Quit  Displaced  Quit 
Individual      
Female -0.024  0.024  -0.083  -0.074 
 (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.039) 
Estonian -0.008  0.036  0.049  0.011 
 (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.049)  (0.047) 
Age 0.008  0.007  0.035  -0.006 
 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.016)**  (0.012) 
Age
2  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.0004)**  (0.000) 
University 0.037  0.016  -0.038  0.093 
 (0.061)  (0.064)  (0.079)  (0.074) 
Technical -0.021  -0.013  -0.118  0.032 
 (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.074)  (0.070) 
Secondary -0.001  0.001  -0.060  0.148 
 (0.050)  (0.054)  (0.093)  (0.079) 
Capital -0.083  -0.015  -0.116  -0.110 
 (0.037)**  (0.033)  (0.053)**  (0.039)** 
Job      
Privatised 0.147  0.011     
 (0.065)**  (0.072)     
State owned  0.055  0.082  0.080  0.057 
 (0.055)  (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.060) 
Foreign owned  0.039  0.026  0.003  -0.163 
 (0.090)  (0.067)  (0.079)  (0.084) 
State (new)  0.022  0.030  -0.053  0.006 
 (0.036)  (0.038)  (0.064)  (0.051) 
Foreign (new)  -0.094  0.154  0.210  0.138 
 (0.064)  (0.052)**  (0.074)**  (0.059)** 
Tenure      
Tenure < 1 yr  0.037  -0.088  -0.014  -0.091 
 (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.102)  (0.085) 
Tenure1-2 year  -0.056  0.029  -0.076  -0.053 
 (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.068)  (0.064) 
Tenure 2-5 yrs  -0.052  -0.002  -0.022  -0.051 
 (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.065)  (0.062) 
Tenure 5-10yrs  0.009  0.022  -0.022  -0.076 
 (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.067)  (0.068) 
Industry        
Manufacturing 0.101  0.081 -0.044 0.043 
 (0.053)  (0.070)  (0.104)  (0.095) 
Construction 0.267  0.185  -0.032  -0.123 
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Retail 0.077  0.045  0.124  0.020 
 (0.057)  (0.069)  (0.111)  (0.097) 
Transport 0.234  0.059  -0.054  0.079 
 (0.071)**  (0.088)  (0.114)  (0.101) 
Finance 0.106  0.133  0.043  0.023 
 (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.124)  (0.118) 
Public Service  0.061  0.047  0.096  0.059 
 (0.063)  (0.072)  (0.120)  (0.105) 
Change indust.  -0.036  0.022  0.023  -0.020 
1 digit  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.046)  (0.036) 
      
Firm size20-99  -0.031  0.018  -0.024  -0.069 
 (0.099)  (0.061)  (0.056)  (0.043) 
 size:100-499  -0.027  -0.050  -0.027  -0.026 
 (0.097)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.053) 
 size: 500+  -0.030  -0.039  -0.007  -0.067 
 (0.092)  (0.062)  (0.093)  (0.081) 
Time Out      
Job-to-job 0.208  0.095  0.157  0.176 
 (0.089)**  (0.106)  (0.101)  (0.071)** 
Out <=3 months  -0.049  -0.059  0.002  0.264 
 (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.219)  (0.178) 
Out 4 months+  0.094  -0.127  0.056  0.044 
 (0.092)  (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.086) 
        
Constant -0.279  -0.170  -0.669  0.200 
 (0.248)  (0.197)  (0.348)  (0.259) 
        
Observations 894  925  324  573 
R-squared 0.07  0.09  0.13  0.10 
Note: Full-time workers only. Wage change is log of difference between last monthly 
wage in old job and first monthly wage in new job. job changes combined across years 
indicated. Model contains year dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. ** 
significant at 5%;      
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 Table 9.  Wage Costs of Displacement – Full-Time workers    
 Displaced  Displaced* 
Time out 
Quit Constant Controls N  R
2 
1992-93 -0.012 
(0.024) 
   0.052** 
(0.007) 
 No  3037  0.01 
1992-93 -0.075 
(0.071) 
   0.063 
(0.047) 
 Yes  3037  0.03 
1992-93 0.040 
(0.033) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
 0.052** 
(0.007) 
 No  3037  0.01 
1992-93 -0.012 
(0.024) 
 0.131** 
(0.026) 
0.052** 
(0.007) 
 No  3037  0.02 
               
1993-94 0.043 
(0.048) 
   -0.044** 
(0.005) 
 No  3556  0.01 
1993-94 0.146 
(0.125) 
     0.035 
(0.095) 
 Yes  3556  0.08 
1993-94 0.155** 
(0.063) 
-0.030** 
(0.013) 
 -0.044** 
(0.005) 
 No  3556  0.01 
1993-94 0.043 
(0.048) 
 0.161** 
(0.033) 
-0.044** 
(0.005) 
 No  3556  0.01 
               
1992-94   0.036 
(0.023) 
   0.004 
(0.009) 
 No  3079  0.01 
1992-94   0.040 
(0.100) 
   0.056 
(0.074) 
 Yes  3079  0.02 
1992-94   0.058** 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
 0.004 
(0.009) 
 No  3079  0.02 
1992-94   0.036 
(0.023) 
 0.071** 
(0.024) 
0.004   
(0.009) 
 No  3079  0.01 
               
1996-95 -0.072** 
(0.023) 
   0.080** 
(0.005) 
 No  2251  0.01 
1996-95 -0.075 
(0.043) 
   0.080 
(0.005) 
 Yes  2251  0.01 
1996-95 -0.063 
(0.035) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
 0.080** 
(0.005) 
 No  2251  0.01 
1996-95 -0.072 
(0.023) 
 0.036** 
(0.020) 
0.080** 
(0.005) 
 No  2605  0.01 
               
1997-95   0.017 
(0.035) 
   -0.025** 
(0.007) 
 No  1940  0.01 
1997-95 -0.046 
(0.066) 
   -0.025** 
(0.007) 
 Yes  1940  0.01 
1997-95   0.066 
(0.042) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
 -0.025** 
(0.007) 
 No  1940  0.01 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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1997-95   0.017 
(0.035) 
 0.150** 
(0.040) 
-0.025** 
(0.0007 
 No  2240  0.02 
               
1999-98 -0.011 
(0.033) 
     0.034** 
(0.003) 
 No  4270  0.01 
1999-98 -0.042 
(0.069) 
     0.034** 
(0.003) 
 Yes  4270  0.01 
1999-98 -0.040 
(0.051) 
 0.016 
(0.022) 
 0.034** 
(0.003) 
 No  4270  0.01 
1999-98 -0.011 
(0.033) 
 0.143** 
(0.030) 
 0.034** 
(0.007) 
 No  4581  0.02 
Note: based on regression of change in log real net monthly wage over the   period on dummy variables for 
displacement between first and second period. Default group are those who remain in the same job. 
Controls include change in firm size, ownership from state to private and 1 digit industry. White adjusted 
standard errors in brackets. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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ANNEX  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Destination of Job Movers by Next Labour Market State 
 1992/93  1995/96/98 
 Displaced  Quit  Displaced  Quit 
Job-to-Job 61.7 56.4  48.4  50.1 
Unemployed 20.2    7.6  40.3  20.4 
Inactive- retired   5.4  18.7   4.3   8.2 
Inactive - Other  12.6  17.4   7.0  21.3 
Source: Estonian LFS. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Re-Entry Rates of Job Movers by Next Labour Market State 
 1992/93    1995/96/98   
 Displaced  Quit  Displaced  Quit 
Job-to-Job 100  100  100  100 
Unemployed 75.4  74.4  46.8  50.3 
Inactive- retired  14.7   8.8   8.1   7.8 
Inactive - Other  59.4  51.7  34.7  20.0 
Source: Estonian LFS. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Table A3. Gompertz Proportional Hazard Estimates of Jobless Spell 
Excluding  Movements into Retirement by Gender. 
 1992/93  1995/98 
  Male Female Male Female 
Age  0.096  0.155  0.037  0.137 
  (0.024)** (0.032)** (0.037)  (0.055)**
Age2  -0.001  -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)  (0.001)** 
Primary  -0.537 -0.614 -0.621 -1.165 
  (0.151)** (0.189)** (0.294)** (0.318)** 
Technical  -0.350 -0.253 -0.549 -0.713 
  (0.145)* (0.146)  (0.283)  (0.240)** 
Secondary  -0.210 -0.246 -0.290 -1.121 
  (0.133) (0.138) (0.257) (0.235)** 
Estonian  0.126 0.480 0.348 0.416 
  (0.093) (0.113)**  (0.153)**  (0.186)** 
Capital  0.182 0.108 0.087 -0.041 
  (0.100) (0.109) (0.160) (0.193) 
Job      
Part-time  -0.085  -0.042  -0.768  0.261 
  (0.299)  (0.262)  (0.382)*  (0.368) 
Tenure  0.032 -0.018  0.050 0.032 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.029) (0.030) 
Tenure2  -0.001 0.001  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Firm Size      
20-99  -0.361 0.131  -0.055 -0.334 
  (0.246) (0.255) (0.158) (0.201) 
100-499  -0.284 0.092  0.022  -0.604 
  (0.241) (0.242) (0.229) (0.291)** 
500+  -0.004 0.227  -0.032 -0.620 
  (0.230) (0.232) (0.310) (0.424) 
Industry      
Manufacturing  -0.172  0.067  0.190  -0.588 
  (0.119)  (0.147)  (0.255)  (0.323) 
Construction  0.081  0.075  0.226  -0.256 
  (0.135) (0.248) (0.294) (0.527) 
Retail  0.103 0.223 0.174 -0.777 
  (0.159) (0.157) (0.287) (0.327)** 
Transport  -0.119 0.108  0.008  -0.401 
  (0.164) (0.272) (0.313) (0.436) 
Finance  0.087 0.131 0.612 -0.352 
  (0.207) (0.249) (0.338) (0.439) 
Public service  0.064 0.092 0.546 -1.102 
  (0.178) (0.170) (0.374) (0.387)** 
State owned  -0.259 -0.211 0.152  0.127 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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  (0.149) (0.171) (0.199) (0.230) 
Foreign owned  -0.177 0.049  0.360  0.247 
  (0.225) (0.254) (0.248) (0.344) 
Privatised  0.142  -0.014    
  (0.175)  (0.211)    
1993 dummy  0.060  -0.111    
  (0.080)  (0.095)    
1996 dummy     -0.020  0.519 
     (0.192) (0.247)** 
1998 dummy    -0.320  -0.341 
    (0.178)  (0.232) 
      
Duration dependence.  -.093 -.086 -.135 -.034 
  (.011) (.016) (.032) (.027) 
Unobserved Heterogeneity  .172 .139 .288 .797 
  (.108) (.226) (.288) (.476) 
      
Log L
  -1546.9 -1213.7 -653.6  -556.0 
Observations  943 756 439 392 
Note: log likelihoods for sample pooled across gender are –2789.5 and –1230.9 respectively. 
Likelihood ratio tests: 1992/93 – Chi square (25)= 57.8; 1995/98 – Chi square (26)= 42.6.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Table A4. Mean Real Monthly Wage by Displacement Status 
  Stay  Disp 92  Quit 92  Disp 93  Quit 
93 
Disp 94  Quit 
94 
October 
92 
1651 
(1135) 
1609 
(1006) 
1816 
(1416) 
1560 
(1137) 
1718 
(1362) 
1678 
(1209) 
1742 
(1204)
End 
wage 
     1324 
(1079) 
1473 
(1024) 
  
Start 
wage 
     1623 
(1119) 
2282 
(1851) 
  
October 
93 
1802 
(1270) 
1642 
(1099) 
2191 
(1710) 
1778 
(1260) 
2416 
(1861) 
1724 
(1172) 
1729 
(1216)
End 
wage 
        1466 
(1453) 
1460 
(1040)
Start 
wage 
        1699 
(1329) 
2000 
(1366)
October 
94 
1772 
(1347) 
1557 
(1032) 
2415 
(2658) 
1749 
(1377) 
2194 
(1664) 
1754 
(1314) 
2055 
(1343)
Spring 
95 
1762 
(1241) 
1563 
(1029) 
2286 
(2148) 
1759 
(1425) 
2225 
(1851) 
1689 
(1243) 
2061 
(1390)
Note: Estonian crowns, spring 95 prices. Standard errors in brackets. Full-time workers. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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ANNEX: Labour Market Legislation and Institutions Affecting 
Displacement and the Cost of Displacement  
 
Employment protection legislation in the private sector 
 
In Estonia, indviduals work under an employment contract, under a "work undertaking contract"
15 or in the 
civil service, where the Public Service Act regulates employment. 
 
Employment Contract (law entered into force in July 1, 1992) 
 
An employment contract can be terminated: (a) by mutual agreement of parties - the employment contract 
may be terminated at any time the opposite party gives written consent; (b) upon expiry of the contract; (c) 
on the initiative of the employee; (d) on the initiative of the employer; (e) at the request of third parties - 
e.g. if the work endangers the health, morality or education of a teenager, the employment contract may be 
terminated on the request of third parties (parent, guardian or labour inspector); or (f) in circumstances 
which are independent of the parties. 
 
The termination of a contract on the initiative of the employer 
 
There are several reasons for an employer to terminate the employment contract – liquidation of the 
enterprise, bankruptcy, unsuitability of an employee due to inappropriate professional skills or for reasons 
of health, unsatisfactory results of a probationary period, (see Table A7 for a detailed description of reasons 
and legal bases for termination of employment contract). 
 
The advance notification period varies from two weeks (in case of long-term incapacity) to four months 
(when laying off workers who have continuously worked for the employer more than ten years). Severance 
pay varies from one monthly average wage (unsuitability of the worker) to four months of the individual 
worker's average wage (when laying off workers who have continuously worked for the employer more 
than ten years). Failure to adhere to the terms of notification results in the employer having to pay the 
employee’s average daily wage for each of the working days short of the advance notice. More extensive 
information on severance pay and notification stipulations is given in Table A8. 
 
The employer is can not terminate the employment contracts of temporarily ill employees, of employees on 
holiday or on strike, of pregnant women and women raising children younger than three years of age. 
Minors' contracts cannot be terminated because of unsatisfactory performance during the probation period. 
Termination of the working contract with a workers’ representative (Labour Contract Law) on the 
employer’s initiative during the period of performance of representative functions and within one year after 
the end of this period is permitted only with the consent of the Labour Inspectorate. In the case of 
liquidation or bankruptcy of the enterprise, or in the case of long-term illness, incapacitating the workers' 
representative, s/he may be dismissed without this consent. The Labour Inspectorate has to give written 
justification for this decision and has to consult the employees’ union before deciding. Dismissal of a 
representative due to actions in protection of workers’ interests is illegal. Notification periods and 
stipulated levels of severance pay do not apply to secondary jobs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 "Work Undertaking Contract" is a civil law contract under which the "work undertaker" (contractor) is 
obligated to do the work (prescribed by the costumer) on its own risk. The main difference between a work 
undertaking contract and an employment contract is that the first type of contract regulates the outcome of 
the work, while the second type regulates the process of work. A work undertaking contract assumes two 
equal parties at the same time, whilst an employment contract establishes subordinate relations. Thus, when 
working under a work undertaking contract, the guarantees prescribed in labour law do not apply to the 
"work undertaker" (contractor). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Release of workers from the Civil Service under the Public Service Act ( 1996) 
 
The main difference in the layoff regulations relates to the levels of severance pay. They are as follows: 
For employment in the Civil Service of less than 3 years - salary of two months; 
3-5 years - salary of three months; 
5-10 years - salary of six months; 
10 and more years - one annual salary. 
 
Unemployed civil servants have during the first six months of unemployment a right to be listed in the 
reserve list of officials. The reserve list is meant to assist former Civil Servants to find more easily a new 
job. If there is a vacant position, it is filled in the first instance with an official from the reserve list (if s/he 
has the requested skills and experience). The period on the reserve list is considered as service when the 
years of service are counted. Persons on the reserve list must undergo in-service training, re-training or 
evaluation, refusal to participate will result in the removal from the reserve. 
 
Sources of Income Support for the unemployed 
 
The Law on Social Protection of the Unemployed came into effect on 1 January 1995. Government decrees 
regulated unemployment issues before 1995. The major changes made in the 1995 law were that the 
interval between going to the employment office and registration as an unemployed person was reduced 
from 30 days to 10 working days, and that labour market concepts were codified in the text taking 
suggestions made by the ILO on board. 
 
Eligibility for status of unemployed and for unemployment benefit 
 
The right to labour market services and state unemployment benefit is enjoyed, as a rule, by permanent 
residents of Estonia. According to the Law on Social Protection of the Unemployed, a person is registered 
as being unemployed within 10 working days after going to the state employment office if he/she satisfies 
the following conditions: 
he/she is between 16 years old and the retirement age; 
he/she has no working occupation or equivalent activity; 
he/she is looking for a job; 
he/she has been employed for at least 180 days during the 12 months preceding appearance at the state 
employment office; no previous employment is required of those who have been looking after a disabled 
child or a child under 7 years of age, persons undergoing hospital treatment, persons nursing a sick, 
disabled or elderly person, disabled persons or those under arrest or serving a prison sentence; 
 
An extended waiting period of 60 days is required before benefit is received for those who have: 
studied at an educational institution as a full-time student before registering as unemployed; 
quit their last job voluntarily, and done so not because of illness or disability, nor in order to nurse a sick or 
disabled person, nor to enter the national defence forces; been dismissed due to violation of a labour 
contract, breach of trust or an undignified act. 
 
The unemployed are required to actively search for work by appearing at the unemployment office at 15 
day intervals. Failure to do so can result in the suspension of benefit payments for that period. After 
repeated "no shows" an unemployed person may be deprived of status and the right to unemployment 
benefits. However, a person who has lost unemployed status is entitled to re-register as a job-seeker.
 16 
 
                                                           
16 At the start of 2001 the new acts of  “Labour Market Services” and “Social Protection of the 
Unemployed” came into force. The new “Social Protection of the Unemployed Act” redefines the 
definition of unemployment, abolishing the requirement of previous employment. This requirement is 
applied only in the case of unemployment benefits. Those laid-off, get the right to apply for labour market 
services. So, more persons, including long-term unemployed, can now register as unemployed and become 
eligible for labour market services. Also the time limit for registering as unemployed was abolished. Only 
the payment of unemployment benefits is now, in general, limited to 270 days. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Unemployment benefits  
 
Originally the level of unemployment benefit was pegged to the minimum wage: in October 1992 the rate 
was fixed at 180 Kroons, which at that time made up 60% of the minimum wage. The rate was not changed 
until July 1996, when it was raised to 240 Kroons. The difference between the minimum wage and the 
unemployment benefit has increased steadily - with unemployment benefit falling to 32% of the minimum 
wage in 1999 (see Table A1.). The level of unemployment benefit is insufficient to cover expenditures on 
the minimum food basket (573 EEK in 1999), and far below the minimum means of subsistence (the 
average in 1999 was 1170 EEK).  
 
TABLE A5. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT LEVELS 
Effective date for 
unemployment benefits 
Unemployment benefits (EEK)  The ratio of unemployment 
benefit to minimum wage (%) 
01.10.1992 180  60 
01.07.1996 240  35.3 
01.03.1998 300  27.3 
01.01.1999 400  32.0 
 
Unemployment benefit is paid every 15 days for every day of unemployment until the individual is no 
longer unemployed, but for not more than 180 calendar days in succession. A decree of the Labour Market 
Board, dated March 1993, extended the payment of benefits to those who had forfeited the social status of 
being unemployed, if they had registered as a job-seeker
17 and not found a job within 30 days. If the 
employment office is unable to send a job-seeker to a training measure, the job-seeker may apply for 
unemployment benefits three times during the subsequent 180 calendar days, but for no more than 30 days 
at a time. Following the exhaustion of unemployment benefits six months into unemployment, workers 
become eligible for Social Welfare Benefits. These are subject to registration at the employment office, are 
means tested, but open-ended.  
 
Social Welfare Benefits 
 
Social welfare in Estonia is regulated by the Social Welfare Act (passed in 1995
18). The main social benefit 
of the state is subsistence benefit, which is paid to persons whose monthly income is below the subsistence 
level. Since April 1994, this benefit is granted and paid on a monthly basis by rural municipality or city 
governments from funds in the state budget prescribed for this purpose. During 1994 - 1996 a second 
benefit was paid in the form of a housing allowance. This allowance, coming from the state budget, 
covered those housing costs that within the standard allotted living space
19 exceeded one third of the 
family’s income. From 1997, persons whose income is below the subsistence level established by the 
Government of the Republic receive a single subsistence benefit instead of the former two benefits. The 
basis for applying for subsistence benefits is the monthly income of a person (family) after expenses
20 
connected with  housing within the allotted living space have been subtracted.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17 A job-seeker in Estonia is person, who voluntarily registers at the state employment office and wants a 
full-time job immediately, is willing to undergo labour market training and appears at the employment 
office at least once every 10 working days. 
18 The basis for financing welfare changed in 1999, becoming increasingly focused on individual needs. 
19 18 square meters of total area a family member and a supplementary 15 square meters is considered 
standard allotted living space. As an exception, the total area of an apartment in the case of a two-room 
apartment, and not more than 51 square meters in the case of an apartment with a larger number of rooms, 
may be deemed to be the standard allotted living space of a pensioner who lives alone. 
20 In some local governments electricity, gas and firewood expenses may be partially compensated from the 
subsistence benefit funds of the state budget. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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The subsistence level is as follows: 
1.04.1994 – 280 EEK, 
1.10.1994 – 320 EEK, 
1.02.1996 – 390 EEK, 
1.01.1997 – 460 EEK, 
1.11.1997 – 500 EEK. 
 
Subsistence benefit is paid to single persons on the basis of the said amounts and are taken as a basis for 
finding the subsistence level for the first family member. Consumption coefficients are used for each 
subsequent family member. The consumption coefficient for children under 14 years of age on April 1, 
1994 was 0.5, raised to 0.7 on July 1, 1994 and to 0.8 on January 1, 1999. 
 
Wage Setting Institutions 
 
Wage legislation 
Before the 1994 Wage Law came into effect, wage setting was regulated by government decrees. Wages 
were set according to nominal salary grades, which were changed very often in the early 1990s because of 
persistent high inflation. 
 
Wages under the Employment Contract 
 
The law establishes minimum wages and rates for overtime, night-time and holiday work, while actual 
wages are subject to individual and collective bargaining. The additional compensation paid for an hour of 
overtime work must be at least 50% of the usual wage. The additional compensation for an hour of work in 
the evening time (6 PM - 10PM) must be at least 10% of the usual wage. Work at night (10 PM - 6 AM) 
has to be remunerated with a 20% additional wage payment. The usual wage rate has to be doubled if the 
worker is required to work on holidays. 
 
Unions and their role in wage setting 
 
The Trade Unions Act has been in force since 1989 and establishes the definition and tasks of trade unions 
and prohibits dissolving and restricting their operations. It stipulates that employees can be represented by a 
union in any enterprise or organisation that has three or more employees. All employees are entitled to 
unionise, including the police and civil servants.  
 
Wages are bargained over individually or collectively. Collective bargaining over wages takes place 
directly between representatives of the trade unions and of employer organisations. Union density is, 
however, quite low in Estonia (between 12% and 18% across sectors in 1999) and not many collective 
bargaining agreements are concluded.  
 
Much wage regulation is done through state level labour legislation. In this area, trade unions are important 
as they negotiate over laws concerning labour regulations. Tripartite agreements have gained more 
importance from year to year. These concentrate mainly on income issues, in particular the minimum wage, 
tax-free income and unemployment benefit. Despite this, the minimum wage , the minimum wage is still 
low in comparison with the average wage as Table A6 shows.  
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Table A6. Minimum and average wage per month 
Effective date of the 
minimum wage 
Minimum wage 
per month 
(EEK) 
Growth (previous 
min. wage=100) 
Average nominal monthly 
wage before taxes (EEK) 
Share 
(%) 
01.10.1992 300       
01.09.1994 450  150%  1734  26.0 
01.01.1996 680  151%  2985  22.8 
01.02.1997 845  124%  3573  23.6 
01.01.1998 1100  130%  4125  26.7 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
 
Table A7. Minimum wage, minimum subsistence level and tax free income in EEK 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Minimum  wage  300 300 300 450 680 845 1100 
Minimum  subsistence  level   280 280 320 390 460 500 
Tax-free  income      500  500  500 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
 
One objective of the Association of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) is to equalise the minimum wage and 
tax-free income
21. EAKL has also the objective to raise unemployment benefits to at least 50% of minimum 
wage. Negotiations over unemployment benefits have, however, been even less successful than 
negotiations over the minimum wage.  
                                                           
21 EAKL negotiates over the levels of minimum wage or minimum living standard  TALO negotiates over 
the wage fund. Thus, wage levels for workers are not the issues of collective bargaining at state level.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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TABLE A8. LEGAL PROVISIONS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN ESTONIA
22 
The reason of 
dismissal 
Notice period
23  Redundancy pay  Procedural obligations  Exemptions 
Liquidation of 
enterprise 
Not less than 2 months  Compensation to employees who have been 
employed continuously: 
up to 5 years -  2 months’ average wage, 
5-10 years - 3 months’ average wage, 
10 and more years - 4 months’ average wage
Employer is required to offer another 
position to the employee if possible. If 
employer has vacant positions he is obligated 
to re-employ the released worker upon his 
demand within six month. 
The information regarding the number, 
occupation, age and sex of the released 
employees has to be submitted to the local 
employment office. 
Written notice of the reason of termination 
of contract and the measures taken to 
provide work to employee has to be sent to 
the organisation or person representing 
employees. 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman or woman raising 
under three years old child is allowed 
only with the consent of local labour 
inspector. 
Bankruptcy of 
the employer 
Not less than two 
weeks, if the enterprise 
continues to operate 
after the bankruptcy is 
announced. 
No advance notice 
required if enterprise is 
not operating after 
announcement of 
bankruptcy 
Compensation to employees who have been 
employed continuously: 
up to 5 years - 2 months’ average wage, 
5-10 years - 3 months’ average wage, 
10 and more years - 4 months’ average 
wage. 
If an employer lacks the means to pay 
compensation, the state shall pay 
compensation to the employees. 
Compensation is up to employees two 
months’ average wage but not more than two 
months’ wage of the state’s average (since 
1998 three months’ average wage is paid). 
The termination of contract is allowed after 
the bankruptcy order is issued. 
The information regarding the number, 
occupation, age and sex of the released 
employees has to be submitted to the local 
employment office. 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman or woman raising 
under three years old child is allowed 
only with the consent of local labour 
inspector. 
Lay-off
24 Notice  period  to 
employees who have 
been employed 
continuously: 
Compensation to employees who have been 
employed continuously: 
up to 5 years -  2 months’ average wage, 
5-10 years - 3 months’ average wage, 
An employer has the right to terminate 
employment contracts upon a decrease in 
work volume, reorganisation of production 
or work, reinstatement of an employee in a 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman and woman raising 
under three years old child is not 
allowed.  
                                                           
22 These provisions only apply to primary jobs.  
23 Upon failure to adhere to the terms, an employer is required to pay compensation to the employee in the amount of the employee’s average daily wages for each 
working day short of advance notice of termination of the employment contract 
24 If the number of laid-off during the three month is 10-20 and their reemployment is not guaranteed the person or organization representing workers may stop 
the termination of contract up to one month. If the number is more than 20 the termination may be stopped up to three month. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
  44
The reason of 
dismissal 
Notice period
23  Redundancy pay  Procedural obligations  Exemptions 
up to 5 years not less 
than 2 months, 
5-10 years not less than 
3 months, 
10 and more years not 
less than 4 months 
10 and more years - 4 months’ average wage previous position and in other cases which 
require termination of the work. 
Prior to termination of an employment 
contract, the employer is required to offer 
another position to the employee if possible. 
An employer is required to re-employ an 
employee who has been released due to a 
lay-off within six months if the employee so 
desires, if the employer has vacant positions 
The information regarding the number, 
occupation, age and sex of the released 
employees has to be submitted to the local 
employment office. 
Written notice of the reason of termination 
of contract and the measures taken to 
provide work to employee has to be sent to 
the organisation or person representing 
employees. 
The contract of minors is allowed to 
terminate only with the consent of 
labour inspector. 
Notice period to workers’ 
representative person has to be one 
month longer. 
In the first place representatives of 
employees have preferential right to 
stay employed, followed by the 
employees who work for such 
employer as their principal job. Of the 
persons who are employed in a 
principal job, preference is given to 
those who have better performance 
results. 
Unsuitability 
of an employee 
due to 
professional 
skills or for 
reasons of 
health 
Not less than one 
month 
One month’s average wage  The termination is allowed if it is not 
possible to offer another position or if 
employee refused an offered position. 
Written notice of the reason of termination 
of contract and the measures taken to 
provide work to employee has to be sent to 
the organisation or person representing 
employees. 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman or woman raising 
under three years old child is not 
allowed.  
The contract of minors is allowed to 
terminate only with the consent of 
labour inspector. 
Notice period to workers’ 
representative person has to be one 
month longer. 
Unsatisfactory 
results of a 
probationary 
period
25 
No advance notice 
required 
No compensation is paid  The employment contract might be 
terminated within the probation period 
included the last day of probation period. 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman or woman raising 
under three years old child is allowed 
only with the consent of local labour 
inspector. 
The termination of contract with 
minors is not allowed. 
                                                           
25 A probationary period cannot exceed four months 
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The reason of 
dismissal 
Notice period
23  Redundancy pay  Procedural obligations  Exemptions 
The long-term 
incapacity for 
work of an 
employee 
Not less than two 
weeks 
No compensation is paid    The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman and woman raising 
under three years old child is not 
allowed. 
The age of an 
employee (if 
person is 65 
years old and 
has right to full 
old-age 
pension) 
If the employee has 
been continuously 
employed: 
less than 10 years – 2 
months; 
more than 10 years – 3 
months 
Compensation to employees who have been 
employed continuously: 
up to 5 years - 2 months’ average wage, 
5-10 years - 3 months’ average wage, 
10 and more years - 4 months’ average wage
  
Breach of 
duties an 
employee 
Loss of trust in 
an employee 
An incident act 
by an 
employee 
No advance notice 
required 
No compensation is paid  An employer is required to adhere to the 
procedure prescribed by law for imposing 
disciplinary punishments for terminating the 
contract. 
The disciplinary punishment is allowed to 
impose within six months after the date the 
offence is committed, but not later than one 
month after becoming aware of the offence. 
If the offence is proved by findings of an 
inventory, review, audit, etc., the punishment 
may be imposed within a year after the 
offence is committed. 
The termination of contract with 
pregnant woman or woman raising 
under three years old child is allowed 
only with the consent of local labour 
inspector. 
Sources: RT…William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
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Figure A1. Cox-Snell Residual Plots of Parametric Hazard Models (Displaced 1992/93) 
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Figure A2. Cox-Snell Residual Plots of Parametric Hazard Models (Quits 1992/93) 
Cox-Snell residual
 Weibull prediction  Cox-Snell residual
0 2 4 6
0
2
4
6
Cox-Snell residual
 Log-Logistic prediction  Cox-Snell residual
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4
Cox-Snell residual
 Gompertz prediction  Cox-Snell residual
0 2 4 6
0
2
4
6
Cox-Snell residual
 Weibull + Het  Cox-Snell residual
0 2 4 6
0
2
4
6
Cox-Snell residual
 LogLogistic + Het  Cox-Snell residual
0 .5 1 1.5 2
0
1
2
3
4
Cox-Snell residual
 Gompertz + Het  Cox-Snell residual
0 2 4 6
0
2
4
6
 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 489 
  48
Figure A3. Cox-Snell Residual Plots of Parametric Hazard Models (Displaced 1995/96/98) 
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Figure A4. Cox-Snell Residual Plots of Parametric Hazard Models (Quits 1995/96/98) 
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